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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 1
                     NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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     SILICON GENESIS CORPORATION, ) Case No. 22-CV-4986
 3
                                   ) San Francisco, California
     Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
 4
                                   ) July 20, 2023
                                   ) 9:17 a.m.
 5
               v.
     EV GROUP E. THALLNER, GmbH,
                                  ) Re: Motion hearing
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     Defendant/Counterplaintiff.
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                        TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
 9
              BEFORE THE HONORABLE JACOUELINE SCOTT CORLEY
                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
     APPEARANCES:
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                       BY:
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Thursday, July 20, 2023 9:17 a.m. 1 2 PROCEEDINGS --000--3 (In open court.) 4 THE CLERK: Calling civil action C22-4986, SiGen v. 5 EVG. 6 7 Counsel, please come up to the podium. MR. POE: Good morning, Your Honor; Mark Poe for the 8 plaintiff. 9 10 THE COURT: Good morning. MR. BALL: Good morning, Your Honor; Matt Ball from 11 K&L Gates for the defendant. New. 12 13 THE COURT: New, yes. Welcome then. I wanted you to be here because, of course, discovery closes August 31st, and 14 15 so when we're done here, you two gentlemen need to sit down and map it all out to get it all done. 16 But first, let's address the motion to dismiss the two 17 causes of action in the counterclaim. 18 19 So I'll give you my tentative -- well, we'll start with the first -- the first claim, the breach of section 5.5 of 20 21 the license agreement, just the plain reading doesn't obligate SiGen not to receive confidential information. It just doesn't 22 do it. 23 24 I mean, maybe you have a claim against KPMG; or, if 25 SiGen's side, a nondisclosure of that, but it's just not there

in the license agreement.

MR. BALL: Well, it sounds like the Court may have made up its mind, but what I would say to that is if you interpret section 5.5 to read out an obligation of SiGen not to access the confidential information, I mean, it seems to me that it does not follow the parties' intent.

THE COURT: Well, the parties can intend whatever they want, but then what we enforce is what's written in the contract.

As I said, there's -- you allege that there is a nondisclosure agreement that was signed by EVG and KPMG, so go after KPMG if that's what you think, right? I can only enforce the con -- I mean, you know that.

MR. BALL: I hear you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You know that. And I know you didn't draft the claim, but you know that.

MR. BALL: It doesn't sound like I'm going to make much headway.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know what do you want me to do. I mean, I'm reading the plain language. Show me the language that we would instruct a jury to find if they breached it or not. Just where is it? I'm looking at it. What is interesting is your opposition didn't cite the language.

It's not there. Okay. All right.

Now, with respect to the SLAPP motion, how does your

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counterclaim not breach section -- the one that -- here we
qo -- prohibits the parties from using, in any proceeding, the
fact of the settlement?
        MR. POE: Well, there are two, Your Honor. That's not
what the language -- what the parties say.
         THE COURT: Well, let me -- it says, "The parties
agree that the terms and existence of this agreement shall not
be used in any dispute or proceeding."
        MR. POE: In my reading, shall not be used or
admissible as evidence.
         THE COURT: Yes, but shall not be used "or."
                                                       Shall
not be used "or." So shall not be used in any dispute or
proceeding. How is it you used it in your complaint? You used
it.
                  I want to go back to the language there,
        MR. POE:
Your Honor, and we talk about superfluous language is not found
in contracts. And so if the prohibition was simply "shall not
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MR. POE: I want to go back to the language there,

Your Honor, and we talk about superfluous language is not found
in contracts. And so if the prohibition was simply "shall not
be used," period, without respect to the word "evidence," then
the words "or admissible as evidence," would not make any
sense.

THE COURT: No, no, no. See, here's your problem is I spent 11 years doing a lot of settlement conferences and helping people negotiate settlements. And the reason they entered into settlements is they then agree, you know what, nothing can be drawn from the settlement, the fact that we

entered into it. We just did it.

And you just took that and threw that out the door and then tried to draw an inference from it, which is actually completely impermissible, completely impermissible. There is no -- zero inference to be drawn from the fact that a settlement was entered into, number one; and number two, the parties specifically contracted for there to be no inference to be drawn because it wasn't to be used.

Now, it's true with respect to their opposition to your SLAPP motion they misstate *Olson* -- not you, because you didn't draft it -- but the brief completely misstates the law and says that the SLAPP law doesn't apply to contract claims. It doesn't say that.

And Olson, Supreme Court case, did not decline to apply it, but Olson did say, we're not going to reach it. Huge distinction there. Huge distinction. You didn't draft it, so I'm not going to make you defend it, but that was a misstatement in that brief.

On the other hand, it's also -- what it is, is, you look at it and you say, well, would it be consistent with the policy behind the SLAPP statute to apply here.

Here it would not. Here it's exact opposite. It cannot be that you can enter into a settlement agreement and say we're not going to use this for any purpose and that you can then go ahead in another proceeding and use it for exactly

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that purpose.
         "I want you, Judge, to draw an inference that they did
something wrong because they entered into a settlement
agreement." That's the exact opposite -- right? -- and it
can't be that the SLAPP statute protects that.
        MR. POE: I recognize Your Honor's spent numerous
years in settlement conferences assisting me in one of those.
                     I did? Oh, I didn't even remember that
         THE COURT:
one.
        MR. POE: It was a long time ago, 2014.
        THE COURT:
                    Wow.
        MR. POE: I spent 19 years, not all of which, but
negotiating settlements. And if I were negotiating settlement
and I wanted to include a provision that said the parties may
not refer to this settlement, I would write, "The parties may
not refer to this settlement in any dispute."
         "Used or admissible as evidence," admissible as
evidence must mean something.
                    No. Used -- yes. Used "or."
         THE COURT:
        MR. POE: Right. But if it were just used, then "or
admissible as evidence" would be a complete --
        Because if you can't use the thing --
                   Okay. Here's the thing. On your
        THE COURT:
motion -- right? -- I have to find that they cannot prevail on
this claim as a matter of law. And I can't find that because
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drawing inferences in their favor in terms of -- this language is susceptible to that interpretation, that that violated it.

There we are. Maybe go to summary judgment and maybe you'll, in your month that you have, you'll take a deposition and you go it's a complete waste of time, but maybe as to what it means, right? I mean, that's what you two gentlemen can sit here and talk about is actually let's just get to the merits of this case and stop this side show and everyone just paying their lawyers for other things. But no. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. That language is susceptible and it makes perfectly good sense to me. And I would not draw that inference. I don't -- that is not a reasonable inference to be drawn.

When someone enters into a settlement, they are not -and that means we're just resolving it. We're just resolving
it as a settlement. And so I don't even think it supports the
claim anyway. It didn't need to be in there. But I think it's
arguably -- and I can't say it doesn't -- states a violation of
the settlement agreement. What their damages are, I don't
know, but that's not before me.

MR. POE: It was cited by Your Honor in the order denying the motion to dismiss as facts alleged that supported our claim that there were other unlimited systems, and so I don't know. At one point it was relied on by the Court as a relevant fact in support of our allegation.

THE COURT: But I didn't know about the settlement. I

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     didn't know about this provision, did I?
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             MR. POE: Well --
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              THE COURT:
                          That wasn't placed in front of me.
             And if I did, then I was wrong. Then I was wrong.
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     And if you want me to go back and look at the motion to dismiss
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     and whether I denied it, I'll do that as well.
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                       I'm not familiar with that procedure, so --
                          I don't know. I mean, I don't know.
              THE COURT:
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     I was wrong. All I know is what I now have presented to me is
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     their counterclaim for breach of that. And then you did the
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     anti-SLAPP and then they amended and we did this. And this is
     exactly what I warned the parties might happen at the beginning
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     of the case is that it's just going to blow up into something
    bigger and that, it seems, is what we have, and we need to get
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    back on track.
              But now explain to me, though, because you have three
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     theories within this claim, right? One was the breach of a
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     settlement agreement and two was that they are seeking a
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     claim -- they are seeking royalties for products which were
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     released.
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                                That's right.
             MR. BALL: Yeah.
              THE COURT: Okay. Are you seeking royalties on
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    products which were released, so that -- which were -- predate
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     the audit -- sold predating the audit?
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And that is actually not their

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MR. POE:

No.

allegation.

Their allegation is that the settlement released products that were sold through -- was it? -- August 31st, 2018, through some date in 2018 --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. POE: -- and that by -- in the several quarters thereafter, by -- when they would send their royalty reports and they would say "Please send us an invoice for our bookkeeping," when SiGen would send them an invoice -- this is in 2019 -- that conduct is now a breach of the settlement agreement because of the theory that we have now alleged in the second amended complaint. Now, this is not a theory breach of I've heard before.

THE COURT: Wait. Just a straight question. You are not seeking royalties on any products that were sold within your definition of what sold means before that date. What is that date? It's a 2018 date.

MR. BALL: I don't have the exact date in front of me, Your Honor, but that's the understanding that I have of the claim is that they are seeking royalties for payments that were made, you know, before the settlement agreement.

THE COURT: Well, no, that were sold.

MR. BALL: Yeah, that was resolved, that should have been resolved in the past.

THE COURT: So that's all I want to know is, are you

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     disavowing any intent to seek royalties on products that were
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     sold under your definition of sold prior to that date?
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              MR. POE:
                       I believe -- now, there is this document
     EVG165 we refer to it as, a list of the systems that EVG says
 4
     are at issue.
                    I believe there is one that has an order date
 5
     that predates that closing date of -- the end date for the
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 7
     settlement period.
              THE COURT: And so are you seeking royalties for that
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 9
    part?
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              MR. POE:
                       Yes.
11
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
                       I can tell you the reason, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Well, tell me why that doesn't fall within
     the release of the settlement agreement.
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              MR. POE:
                        Because the settlement agreement is
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     extremely clear that the language of the settlement agreement,
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     the fact of the settlement agreement shall have no bearing on
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     the proper interpretation of the licensing agreement.
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     decided -- it was in footnotes -- I'm not sure if Your Honor
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     saw that, or I could direct you to where it is.
                         Well, I'm reading the release from EVG
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              THE COURT:
     2.1, "Releases EVG from all claims and liabilities arising out
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     of or relating to products sold before the end of the audit
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     period." Are you saying it doesn't come within the definition
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     of products?
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              MR. POE:
                        No.
                             It is a product, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          So how, under that language, then -- so
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     now I'm just addressing whether they essentially state a claim,
            How is it that they don't state a claim, then, that you
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     are seeking a --
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                        That is not -- you have to -- reading the
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     amended counterclaims, that is not what their allegation is
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     that now in this litigation we are seeking royalties on
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     machines that were released. I brought the amended
 9
     counterclaim.
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              So it's paragraph 30 of the amended counterclaims.
              THE COURT:
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                          Yes.
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              By demanding royalties for products that under your
     definition of sale were sold prior to September 30, 2028.
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                        I just wish I had -- apparently it's not
              MR. POE:
     referring to in this litigation we are demanding royalties.
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     It's saying by -- it says something about like "subsequently
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     commanded or something about the invoices in there.
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                                                            The
     allegation is that by SiGen sending invoices --
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              THE COURT: Not in paragraph 30. Do you want to look
     at it?
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22
                        Oh.
                             Thank you.
              MR. POE:
                          It has my work product on it, and I'm not
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              THE COURT:
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     waiving that by showing it to you.
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         (Pause in proceedings.)
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             MR. POE:
                        Right. You have to go back to --
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              THE COURT:
                          I just have that one page. The three
     theories are set forth there in 29, 30 and 31.
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             MR. POE: So it is -- the allegation is cleared up in
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     the factual allegations and I'm just perplexed why I'm not --
              THE COURT: Well, why don't you tell me, what is your
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     second theory there?
             MR. BALL: Yeah. The second theory is that they're
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     seeking royalties for payments that should have been released
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     under the settlement agreement based on the theory of when a
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     sale occurs. So if there's payments made before the date the
     release takes effect, they're trying to get royalties for those
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     payments even though they should have been released.
     the breach.
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                         Why isn't that an affirmative defense
              THE COURT:
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     rather than a claim?
             MR. BALL: I think it can be both, Your Honor.
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                                                              Ι
     mean, you know, when I was researching this -- and, you're
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     right, the law on the SLAPP and the litigation privilege as
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     applicable to contracts is more nuanced than the briefs say.
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     And there is all kinds of cases that were cited -- well, not
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     me, but Sidley cited a couple of them to you. You just bring
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     counterclaims based on breach of settlement agreements.
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     don't know how common it is, but it certainly happens.
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              THE COURT:
                          I don't even know how it works.
                                                           I mean,
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it sounds to me -- they sound to me more like affirmative defenses. You're not going to argue that that affirmative defense would be protected by the litigation privilege?

MR. POE: On that question -- well, let me revert back to -- it's paragraph 16, Your Honor, that sets forth the facts on which that allegation is based in the amended counterclaims. It says, "Yet, following entering into the settlement agreement, SiGen invoiced EVG for payment of royalties for products that were sold prior to September 30, 2018, under either of SiGen's current theories of sale.

"Based on the inconsistent definition of sale that SiGen has taken in this case, SiGen breached section 2.1 of the settlement agreement by demanding and obtaining improper royalty payments or transactions that were paid for and released under the settlement agreement."

That's my point that the allegation -- I mean, I suppose we could verbally say what the allegation is now, but as it's written here in the second amended complaint, the allegation is not that this lawsuit constitutes a breach of the settlement agreement. The allegation is that back in 2019, when Mr. Fong and his staff sent invoices, that now under our current theory, what happened in year four means that something in year one is --

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Fine. Then that's not covered by the SLAPP statute because it's not protected

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     activity.
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              MR. BALL: That's right.
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              MR. POE: No, it's absolutely. They do not contest
     it's protected activity, and it's based on the allegations in
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     our complaint.
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              THE COURT: No. You just said it's based on an
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     invoice --
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              MR. POE: No.
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              THE COURT: -- that was sent in 2019 --
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              MR. POE: No.
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              THE COURT: -- that's not protected activity --
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              MR. POE: No, no.
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              THE COURT: -- under your definition of sold.
              In any event, none of that falls within the SLAPP
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     statute and what it's supposed to be protected against.
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              Now, your paragraph 29 theory, though, makes zero
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     sense to me at all.
              MR. BALL: Yeah. So --
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              THE COURT: That's just referring to an argument that
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     they made in there. It's not even really a claim for breach of
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     contract.
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              MR. BALL: Well, no.
              THE COURT: Let's just cut through this for a moment,
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    because I really -- we have new counsel in here now -- it's a
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    new day -- let's see what we can do.
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Because, by the way, in federal court with a SLAPP statute you grant with leave to amend if you grant anyway, right?

So this is what I think you should do: I don't think any of these really are breach of contract claims. They're actually affirmative defenses. That's actually -- you just want to be protected. If they're seeking royalties on products that were released, you have that defense that they were released.

And, I don't know, with respect to the breach of the settlement agreement, they can agree to take it out of their complaint. It doesn't change anything because there's no inference to be drawn from it in any event, right? And then let's move on. And then let's just move on.

So I think that's what you should talk about.

Or you can amend your complaint and try again. To what end? Zero end. Zero end. There's nothing to be gained for it. If it's just an affirmative defense, that's fine.

Again, you're not about to claim that they can't put release as an affirmative defense, right?

MR. POE: I assume they already have.

THE COURT: Yeah. Exactly. So it can all just be fixed. It can all just be fixed. And so let's figure that out. And then -- so that's what I'm going to do. I'm going to grant the motion to dismiss with leave to amend, and then I

want you guys to figure out what comes next.

MR. BALL: So that would be on the breach of the settlement agreement theory as well? I'm not sure that that was substantively moved on. It was a SLAPP theory only is my understanding of the briefing on the second cause of action in the counterclaim.

THE COURT: I'm just doing it because you didn't write it. It's not clear actually what it is. I don't know what your damages would be from it. In any event, I don't want it to go through and because I think it's all extraneous and a waste of time.

MR. BALL: I understand Your Honor's point.

THE COURT: Right? But if you want to do it again where you draft it, you can. I'm granting you leave to amend.

What I'm suggesting is, it might be better spending your client's time to actually make sure you have affirmative defenses with a real defense. We can all agree that the mention of the settlement agreement has no effect in this case. And let's get on to actually having me adjudicate what sold means -- right? -- which would resolve it all one way or the other.

MR. BALL: I mean, Your Honor is not wrong.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BALL: I understand where you're coming from, and it's choose your own adventure time for me, and I'll take what

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     Your Honor says --
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              THE COURT:
                         Okay.
                         -- into consideration very carefully.
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              MR. BALL:
              THE COURT: All right.
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              So that's just what I'm going to do.
              But the first claim I'm actually not granting leave
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     to -- well, no, I think I have to, but I don't see how 5.5 is
     viable here, but I'll grant leave to amend. You can come up
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     with something. I don't know.
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              Now let's talk about discovery. I did an order and
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     they complied with it or are complying with it?
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              MR. BALL:
                         There is some disagreement on that, Your
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            And I regret to say there another letter being drafted
     right now.
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                               No letter being drafted.
              THE COURT:
                          No.
                                                         This is why
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     I made you come today. You're going to go to the 18th floor
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     lounge and you guys are going to sit there and work everything
     out.
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              And also, you're also going to figure out, because
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     discovery closes August 31st and I'm not moving that date, sit
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     there and plan everything out: When your depos are going to
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    be, what the depos are going to be, where they're going to be,
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     how they're going to be. And then by a week from tomorrow, I
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     want you to submit a stip to me that tells me what your
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     discovery schedule is for getting it all done. And then if you
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still have a letter in there, then you do that, but not until you guys now sit face to face and figure it out.

MR. POE: Mr. Ball and I have met and conferred a couple of times. We have a good rapport.

There are two issues that will require guidance from your counsel, and they're very simple. EVG was required by the 30th of last month to produce all of its invoices, if you recall. It produced the invoices, but they are redacted.

There's a protective order in this case, and of course there's a list of cases as long as my arm saying that a party can't unilaterally redact documents. I have three examples here. This is one where we're at loggerheads.

EVG believes -- you recall they want this AEO designation that's been -- was ruled against twice. They are standing on the ground that they are not going to turn over unredacted invoices even though they were ordered to do so.

If there was an argument in that last letter about, well, we could turn them over but we need to redact them, it could have been addressed then. They were just ordered to produce them by the 30th. They haven't. So I think that could easily be ruled on.

MR. BALL: And, Your Honor, no, it cannot. The things that we redacted are irrelevant trade secrets, and we would definitely want to make that showing to Your Honor before Your Honor --

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THE COURT:
                          Well, I think you're going to have to move
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     for reconsideration.
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              MR. BALL: Of what, Your Honor?
              THE COURT: Well, I think, as Mr. Poe says, I did an
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     order with respect to that.
                                  I mean, I don't know.
              MR. POE:
                       There was -- it was -- their request for an
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    AEO was twice now.
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              THE COURT: But -- but let me just say this:
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    better need the information that they're redacting, right?
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              MR. POE: Yes, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Because it's not a game.
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              MR. POE: Right.
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              THE COURT: And it may be that they're redacting it
     and you're correct that they shouldn't be, but if you actually
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     don't need that information, then, again, then let's not do it.
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              So why can't it be AEO at least?
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                         It can. It absolutely can.
              MR. BALL:
              THE COURT: So why is --
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                       It cannot be, and we went over this in those
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              MR. POE:
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    prior motions.
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              THE COURT:
                         No, no.
              MR. POE: Mr. Fong, who is here, he could explain this
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     if this were an evidentiary hearing, but because I don't know
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     anything about the industry, Mr. Fong says that he will note
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     immediately upon seeing these customer names what proper
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     classification for tiers of royalty that because of the
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     industry --
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              THE COURT:
                         Okay. All right. I already ruled on the
     AEO thing. It was presented to me in some way and --
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                     And have you read those orders?
 5
              Yeah.
             MR. BALL: Yes, I have, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Did you read the briefing?
             MR. BALL: Yes, I read the briefing.
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                         Well, then tell me how you get AEO when I
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              THE COURT:
     said you hadn't made a showing for it.
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             MR. BALL: Because that was a blanket AEO. They were
     going for a blanket AEO designation that they could just do
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13
     willy nilly.
              What I'm telling the Court is, is that these are super
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     sensitive trade secrets.
              THE COURT: Well, then you'll have to move for
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     reconsideration --
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             MR. BALL: That we know sensitive information --
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              THE COURT: -- and tell the Court why the argument
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     you're making could not have been made before, because you
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     don't get a do-over just because new counsel came in because I
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     don't have time to just do things over and over again.
              I took seriously what was presented to me at the time
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     how it was presented, and if it wasn't presented properly,
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     their client's just going to have to live with it.
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              MR. BALL:
                         I will take a look at that and I will
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     review the briefing again just to make sure the procedural
     history is that.
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              And how would the Court want us to report back, I
 4
     quess, is it in a letter format or a motion for reconsideration
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     under the local rules?
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              THE COURT: I think you'd have to do a motion --
              MR. BALL: What's the Court's preference?
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              THE COURT: -- for reconsideration, but I think you'd
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     have to do it as a letter brief because August 31st is our
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     discovery deadline.
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              MR. BALL: Yeah.
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              MR. POE: Well, and that's a problem for us, not for
     them, right, because we're the ones that are wanting to get the
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     documents post haste so that, for example, if there are
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     customers who we need to send subpoenas to that we have time to
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     do that. But if now we're going to be --
              THE COURT: Well, before you subpoena one of their
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     customers, you're going to have to come through me.
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              MR. POE: Okay.
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              THE COURT: Because that is something that can be very
     harmful, and I'm mindful of that.
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              MR. POE:
                        Okay.
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              THE COURT: And I do not allow litigation to have that
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     sort of collateral consequence unnecessarily.
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MR. POE:
                       Okay.
 1
 2
              THE COURT: So you need to tell me and specifically
 3
     why you would need to do that.
              I don't know why you would need to do that. Why can't
 4
     I just decide what sold means first? That you don't need that
 5
     customer information. So maybe what we need to do is to
 6
 7
    bifurcate discovery in some way.
             MR. POE: Bifurcate discovery? I mean, that would
 8
     really -- I mean, I suppose we could. That would really extend
 9
10
     the schedule, I suppose.
11
              THE COURT: Right.
                                  I know. I understand.
                                                          I'd have
12
     to do that, but --
13
             MR. POE: Which we're not -- we're not eager to do.
                                                                   Ι
     mean, my -- like I said --
14
              THE COURT: I'm not eager to do it either, but it
15
     would avoid this problem, because you don't need that in order
16
17
     for me to adjudicate what sold means, correct?
                       That's right. Like I say, I mean, our view,
18
             MR. POE:
     Your Honor, is that they were ordered to produce them and
19
     they're like, all right, he can have half of them.
20
21
             And we also want to file another motion once we --
22
              I feel like everyone will have better, like, clearer
23
     and we'll need to come back to Your Honor fewer times if we
24
     just, like, very squarely follow, you know, the rules and Your
25
    Honor's orders, and they were ordered to produce them and they
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1
     haven't.
 2
              THE COURT: I understand, but the plaintiff and the
     defendant are competitors.
 3
 4
             MR. BALL:
                         Yep.
                       In an extremely narrow sense. SiGen is not
 5
             MR. POE:
     a manufacturer of --
 6
              THE COURT: I understand. I understand, but --
 7
             MR. POE: They're in the same industry.
 8
              THE COURT: -- you told me that you don't need it to
 9
     address the question of what is sold, so I don't know.
10
                                                             Why
11
     don't you two just go talk? We have new counsel here.
             MR. POE: I understand.
12
13
              THE COURT:
                          This case has been so disappointing to me,
     and you had Mr. Robbins, right?
14
15
             MR. POE: Your Honor --
              THE COURT:
                          I mean, a big time -- big firm partner who
16
17
     spent a lot of time, and he tried.
             MR. POE: With permission of EVG's counsel, I would be
18
19
    very happy either to share the parties' settlement positions or
20
     have Your Honor talk to Mr. Robbins about why --
              THE COURT: I don't want to do that, which is another
21
22
     thing I wanted to ask is whether you want me to send you to a
23
    magistrate judge.
24
              MR. BALL: I think any kind of mediation -- I mean, I
25
     trust that Your Honor saw in our statement that Mr. Robbins or
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maybe Your Honor knows that Mr. Robbins has rejoined the DOJ and so, you know, I've tried to catch up with him, but with the transition he's been very busy.

I think this case would benefit from either being sent to a magistrate judge or the appointment of another mediator definitely.

THE COURT: I'm not going to appoint another mediator.

I'd send you to a magistrate judge at this point with no

deadline, and then you guys will talk to the magistrate judge

and he or she will decide what is the appropriate time. And so

it may be much later. I don't know.

MR. POE: There's one other discovery issue. We fairly met and conferred over it and some guidance will help, Your Honor. You might remember -- and I spent six hours on a plane last night but -- so if you could just give me a minute -- if you remember the second time we met -- I think this was in February at the second hearing -- Mr. Bettinger, Sidley Austin attorney -- they said they were going to produce the email. They haven't produced any.

Mr. Bettinger said, well, we asked our client to send us email and they didn't send any, so I guess they don't have any. And Your Honor said that's not how discovery works.

They have now produced email -- and this is on that question of whether they have produced their internal email or only their external email. I have some statistics. EVG has

produced 3,069 emails. Of those, 3,044 were exchanged with a SiGen email address. A total of 25 internal emails have been produced. Those 25 are all in the form of an email between someone in sales administration called Martina Colby and the sales director at EVG called Herman Waltl where she says, "Permission to send this royalty report to SiGen?"

And he says "Yes," in German.

THE COURT: So you believe they have not produced all the emails?

MR. POE: They have not produced anything besides these 25 unless we are to believe -- because these -- the emails, the 3,044 between SiGen and EVG, they span 20 years. Unless we are to believe that there was no internal email ever sent that used the word SiGen over 20 years except for these 25 where she asked permission, well, then the answer is obvious.

And I know we received supplemental RFP responses where EVG purported to describe what had been done. I know that if we asked Mr. Ball, he will say that he doesn't have personal knowledge of that. He'll say, well, that's what I heard from Sidley, and so that's what I've said.

MR. BALL: No.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Ball, this is what I want you to do: You -- I am personally tasking you with verifying what was run and make sure every one of those emails has been produced. And I will told you responsible if they're

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1
     not produced. Not if it hasn't been produced up to now.
 2
     There's new counsel come in and you make sure because that
     is -- does seem odd. Could be possible, but you need to -- and
 3
     maybe have them rerun it.
 4
             MR. BALL:
                         I understand, Your Honor, but what I'd like
 5
     to say is I have discussed this thoroughly with my clients and
 6
 7
     what they say is that their IT department went in and searched
     three email in boxes for SiGen, and this is what the results
 8
           That's what the search was.
 9
     were.
10
              THE COURT: And are those -- and which custodians did
11
     they search?
                         That was the three executives, Herman
12
             MR. BALL:
13
     Waltl, Paul Lindner and Werner Thallner who were the key
    players in terms of dealing with SiGen on license issues.
14
15
     They've been the key players the whole time.
              THE COURT: Okay. That's what your client told you?
16
                         That's correct.
17
             MR. BALL:
18
              THE COURT:
                         Okay. Have you seen that? Did you talk
19
     to IT?
            Did you see what they actually ran?
20
                         I have not -- I have not spoken to their IT
             MR. BALL:
21
     department, and I can do that, Your Honor.
22
                          I would encourage you to do so because I
              THE COURT:
23
     do think -- right? -- I think that's our obligations as
24
     counsel, especially with such a long-running relationship it
25
     does seem odd, so -- and if that's the case, then I would
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1
     expect you to have some explanation then. Your client would
 2
     have some explanation for why there isn't.
 3
             MR. BALL:
                         They do the discussions orally. They sit
     right next to each other in their offices and when they have a
 4
 5
     discussion about the SiGen license, they're all right there.
              THE COURT:
 6
                          Okay.
 7
             MR. BALL:
                         That's what -- that's the explanation.
              THE COURT: All right. Well, just verify that then.
 8
     Just verify it.
 9
10
              MR. BALL: Just so I can comply with that, I mean, I
11
    had them on cross-examination with my clients on this issue.
     I'm pretty sure that this is true. So, I mean, I don't know
12
13
     what else the Court wants me to do, but I'm happy to do it.
              THE COURT: All right. And have they signed a
14
15
     verified document response in which they have attested under
     oath that they have produced everything?
16
17
                         I always get confused about this, Your
             MR. BALL:
     Honor, but my understanding is, is that I don't believe RFP
18
19
     responses are verified in federal court.
20
              THE COURT: I think that's right. But I think in this
     particular case, given the uniqueness of the response, that
21
22
     that would probably be appropriate.
23
             MR. BALL: We are happy to do that.
24
              THE COURT: And I think if they do that, then they do
25
     that.
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1
             MR. BALL: We are happy to do that, Your Honor.
 2
             MR. POE: And of course from my experience when a
     search is run there's something like a hit report, a document
 3
             If that hit report is verified and it tags 25 hits
 4
     over 20 years, there is nothing I can do. Seems a little odd
 5
     in 20 years no ones going to send an email because they sit
 6
    next to each other.
 7
                         It depends because they sit next -- maybe
 8
              THE COURT:
     they don't. I mean, I don't know how old they are. Maybe they
 9
     don't use email.
10
             MR. POE: Not that old, Your Honor.
11
              THE COURT: I mean, I don't know. You know, a lot of
12
    people -- why do these companies actually they get rid of email
13
14
     and they get the -- what is it, the stuff that disappears.
15
             MR. BALL:
                         Yeah.
              THE COURT: People are learning email is not good.
16
                       It's horrible, but they've kept 20 years of
17
             MR. POE:
     communications with SiGen, so that would be --
18
19
              THE COURT:
                         Well, because they can't talk to SiGen
20
     because they're not sitting next to them, so that's perfectly
     logical. Mr. Ball will confirm that that's the case.
21
22
             MR. BALL:
                         Yep.
23
              THE COURT: And they will attest under oath if that's
24
     that.
25
             MR. BALL:
                         That's right.
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THE COURT: Then that's that.

MR. BALL: That's right. And as I said to Mr. Poe, you know, he's free to explore that in the depositions with all of them.

THE COURT: Okay. So I -- with respect to the AE, I'd go back and look at that orders, but those orders are what is governing right now, I would say. And so if what I ruled was that they hadn't made the showing as to AEO, then they hadn't made the showing as to AEO, and then you would need to move for reconsideration.

MR. BALL: Okay. I just want to just emphasize that these are not only the trade secrets of EVG, they are the trade secrets of all of EVG's customers. This is the supply chain for the most popular consumer products in the world. There are NDAs that are just mind numbing --

THE COURT: You don't need to argue it now because I had a motion on it. So you can go back and look at it. You chose to come into the case as the case stands based on what happened, and so there we are.

And there's a certain standard that applies to reconsideration. I know you know what that is, and I know you won't bring the motion if it can't be met. And there's always other alternatives if your client doesn't like that. So there we are.

But what I do want is by next Friday, then, you guys

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1
     to give me a stipulation that identifies through August 31st
 2
     what depo is happening, who's being deposed, whatever
 3
     additional written discovery there is that needs to be done.
     We need to cap on this.
 4
             MR. POE: And I'll just say that hasn't been a
 5
    problem. We've already scheduled a number of depositions, so
 6
     that's not an obstacle.
 7
              THE COURT: Okay. I just want to know because I just
 8
     feel like it's -- yeah. I just want to know.
 9
10
             MR. POE: Don't worry about a thing.
11
              THE COURT:
                          I want to --
             MR. BALL: We got that part, Your Honor, I think.
12
13
              THE COURT: All right. Don't worry about a thing.
             MR. BALL: Uh-huh.
14
                                 And I am going to refer you to a
15
              THE COURT: Great.
     magistrate judge. He or she will contact you, they'll set up a
16
     call and you can talk to them freely about what timing you
17
     think would be good or not good, you know, what happened
18
19
    before, where things are and all of those kinds of things.
20
             MR. BALL: Okay.
21
                         If you -- if you -- yeah.
              THE COURT:
22
             All right. And then do we have a next date here?
             MR. BALL: Boy. Not that I know of, Your Honor.
23
24
     don't think so.
25
                         We should probably -- maybe I should check
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1
     in with you at the end of August by video.
 2
              MR. POE: Sure.
              THE COURT: Unless you have disputes, then I may make
 3
 4
     you come. I do think it's important once in awhile to meet
     face to face.
 5
              MR. POE: This was productive. Thank you.
 6
              THE COURT: Why don't we do -- I think is it August
 7
     31st?
 8
              THE CLERK:
 9
                         31st.
10
              THE COURT: At 1:30 by video with a statement one week
     in advance.
11
12
              MR. BALL: Okay.
13
              THE COURT: Okay. Good luck.
14
                       Thank you, Your Honor.
              MR. POE:
15
              MR. BALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
         (Concluded at 10:07 a.m.)
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CERTIFICATE I certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. o Coulthard July 27, 2023 JENNIFER L. COULTHARD, RMR, CRR DATE Official Court Reporter CA CSR#1445